Tuesday, July 29, 2014

FOMC Report July 29-30, 2014



Communication and Normalizing Fed Policy


When the Federal Reserve last neared a period where removal of accommodation was to be the intent of monetary policy actions, the concept of normalization had a singular reference – the level of support provided.  Normalization from a period of excess accommodation required the Fed simply to increase the Fed Funds rate.  Today, economic support is provided by the Fed in the form of extraordinary accommodative monetary policies.  These policies are extraordinary as much in their abundance as in the method of operation.  In Fed Chair Yellen’s view, normalizing monetary policy today involves two separate goals - adjustment to the stance or level of accommodation provided and also a return to prior methodology of operations. 

Before proceeding with a brief discussion about communication and normalizing monetary policy, we might quickly dispense with a view of the prospects for immediate outcome from the forthcoming FOMC meeting.  First, the Fed has done a wonderful job of adhering to a ‘policy-path’ for reducing securities purchases (tapering).  It is expected to again reduce by a total of $10b, the level of agency mortgage-backed securities and Treasuries purchased monthly to new levels of $10b and $15b respectively.  In the statement, the Fed may recognize a somewhat stronger pace of economic growth and employment gains since the last meeting, but would then also likely reference the mixed performance of the housing market.  Finally, the forward guidance on Fed Funds will likely not be changed.  At some point, the Fed will introduce additional guidance both for policy rate and the balance sheet, but it is not expected at this meeting. 


Normal is as Normal Does

Dr. Janet Yellen was charged in 2010 by then Chairman Bernanke to lead a FOMC subcommittee on communications.  As such, we might look to her assessments described in an April 2013 speech ‘Communication in Monetary Policy’1 to better understand her interests for the direction for monetary policy communications and implications for operations.  In doing so, I think you will agree that Chair Yellen has indicated a desire to return monetary policy operations toward a more ‘old school’ Fed Funds based approach.  At the same time, she has a strong belief in the benefit of guidance. 

While it is difficult to imagine any striking change to the message immediately following this meeting, the Chair recognizes the importance of the post-FOMC statement; ‘The Committee's most watched piece of communication is the written statement issued after each of its meetings, which are held roughly every six weeks. It may seem quaint that my colleagues and I continue to spend many hours laboring over the few hundred words in this statement, which are then extensively analyzed only minutes after their release.’   In general we understand that if there is a nuanced shift in describing something in the FOMC statement, it is not likely a mistake but rather an attempt to reshape consensus view. 

There were several instances within this speech where Dr. Yellen made reference to ‘normal’ monetary policy and an interest in returning to such.  In referencing a long road to recovery she noted; ‘I am encouraged by recent signs that the economy is improving and healing from the trauma of the crisis, and I expect that, at some point, the FOMC will return to a more normal approach to monetary policy.’ 

Having recognized the amazing advances in pace for all measures of public communication, she advised; ‘The revolution in the FOMC's communication, however, isn't about technology or speed.  It's a revolution in our understanding of how communication can influence the effectiveness of monetary policy.’   It is apparent that the Fed under Janet Yellen will go to great lengths to achieve higher levels of monetary policy effectiveness through communication. 

Again and again she points toward a normal monetary policy in; ‘In normal times, the Committee pursues these goals (to promote maximum employment and stable prices) by influencing the level of a short-term interest rate called the federal funds rate, which is what banks charge each other for overnight loans.’  Her desire to return to a Fed Funds based regime is quite evident.  
 Throughout the speech, then Vice Chair Yellen tells the story of the evolution of Fed communication to include the 2003 reference to ‘policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period’; ‘The FOMC had journeyed from "never explain" to a point where sometimes the explanation is the policy.‘
 While appearing to make a point about the potential difference in the support provided by securities purchases relative to the communication about their holding periods, Yellen made strong argument for providing accommodation through the discussion of SOMA asset disposition; ‘To make these asset purchases as effective as possible in adding accommodation, the FOMC, therefore, needs to communicate the intended path of Federal Reserve securities holdings years into the future.’  Using this as a guide, the Fed has provided some accommodation during the well articulated ‘policy path’ of tapering.  We should expect the Fed to do similarly with respect to its securities holdings going forward.  Yellen added again later; ‘While normalization of the Federal Reserve's portfolio is still well in the future, the FOMC is committed to clear communication about the likely path of the balance sheet.’
The longing for good-old fed fund policy can again be found in; ‘Getting back to more normal economic conditions will allow for a more normal approach to monetary policy. I look forward to the day when we can put away our unconventional tools and return to what now seems like the relatively straightforward challenge of setting the federal funds rate.’
 In wrapping up her speech Yellen finished noting; ‘Communication became even more significant after the onset of the financial crisis when the FOMC turned to unconventional policy tools that relied heavily on communication. Better times and a transition away from unconventional policies may make monetary policy less reliant on communication.’   It is true that less communication is needed in better times.  It is likely also true that too much communication or more specifically, excessive guidance during a ‘restrictive’ monetary policy regime, can offset the intended effect of policy rate firming.  This apparently was the case in 2004-2006 when the Fed used the ‘measured pace’ guidance. 
  
Fed Discusses Exit Strategy
 The FOMC weighed in on exit strategy in the minutes from the June 17-18, 2014 meeting.  Titled ‘Monetary Policy Normalization’2, the section accounted for roughly 15% of the entire lengthy outline of the meeting.  It was noted immediately that the discussion about ‘normality’ is not only of the stance of monetary policy, but also about operational conduct; ‘Meeting participants continued their discussion of issues associated with the eventual normalization of the stance and conduct of monetary policy.’ 
 The minutes caught many by surprise having indicated that interest on excess reserves (IOER) would play a major role in normalizing the policy rate stance; ‘Most participants agreed that adjustments in the rate of interest on excess reserves (IOER) should play a central role during the normalization process. It was generally agreed that an ON RRP facility with an interest rate set below the IOER rate could play a useful supporting role by helping to firm the floor under money market interest rates.’  Prior to the minutes release, it is probably fair to say that a majority of those with a view thought that ON RRP would be doing the heavy lifting.  It may be that in practice that ON RRP does the lion’s share of work, but the Fed may find communication involving IOER as more easily understood by the public, and lending eventually to an smoother transition to ‘old school’ or ‘normal’ policy operations.
 Clearly communication as a policy instrument is given a high degree of importance when we find strategies are devised for its application; ‘A staff presentation included some possible strategies for implementing and communicating monetary policy during a period when the Federal Reserve will have a very large balance sheet.’ 
 Quite possibly more for its familiarity as a benchmark and ease of use in communicating policy intent than as a strong instrument for implementation of policy, most FOMC members want to keep fed funds in the mix; ‘Most participants thought that the federal funds rate should continue to play a role in the Committee's operating framework and communications during normalization, with many of them indicating a preference for continuing to announce a target range.’  If there is a strong interest for eventually removing much of the Fed’s balance sheet and moving back to an operation based on targeting fed funds, it would be a communication nightmare to allow fed funds to disappear while the balance sheet is reduced only to try to introduce it again thereafter.
 Concerning changes to the reinvestment policy, it was noted that the timing of the elimination of reinvestments would have very ‘limited implications for macroeconomic outcomes’.  However, the Fed may choose to use the upcoming event as a forum for communication enhancement.  Although the macroeconomic implications of the timing of the change may be miniscule, a benefit could be derived from communicating its removal.  Not unlike the benefit from describing the ‘policy path’ for tapering, properly communicating changes to the reinvestment policy can add ‘visibility’ to the Fed’s transparency thus providing some support during instances of accommodation removal. 
 Consistent with earlier noted preference for policy path, FOMC members noted; ‘Regardless of whether they preferred to introduce a change to the Committee's reinvestment policy before or after the initial tightening in short-term interest rates, a number of participants thought that it might be best to follow a graduated approach with respect to winding down reinvestments or to manage reinvestments in a manner that would smooth the decline in the balance sheet.’  This too has the sound of ‘policy path’ guidance. 
 Although, ‘participants generally expressed a preference for a simple and clear approach to normalization that would facilitate communication to the public and enhance the credibility of monetary policy’, this may be more difficult than in the past as they have admitted ‘they expected to learn more about the effects of the Committee's various policy tools as normalization proceeds’.  Because they have much to learn, ‘many favored maintaining flexibility about the evolution of the normalization process as well as the Committee's longer-run operating framework.’  Here in lies a challenge for the Fed.  Even though more open communication is desired, the flexibility required to wind down current extraordinary accommodation may not allow simple and long lasting policy directive. 
 Chair Yellen and the balance of the FOMC committee would like, when the time comes, to remove accommodation in a straight forward and easily communicated fashion.  They may attempt to highlight fed funds for the benefit of public understanding and a hoped for eventual return to prior standard operating procedures.  However, their challenge in communicating policy intent may be easier than detailing over a longer period what tools will be used to accomplish those ends.  To the extent economic agents have become accustomed to knowing with relative certainty an exaggerated period of forthcoming monetary policy intent, there is a decided likelihood that volatility in both economic variables and performance could increase. 
 Therefore we should anticipate that wherever possible the Fed will engineer ways to provide some guidance in the use of policy tools.  Consistent with the reduction of the pace of securities purchases (tapering) where the Fed gave ample information before the initiation as to a likely discrete interval value changes, the Fed will provide similarly in the future for policy rates as well as the make-up and disposition of the SOMA portfolio.
 Finally, the Fed will not likely be ready at the conclusion of this meeting to provide a concrete framework for the initiation and early phase of accommodation removal.  Because of waning value in the guidance for tapering, projected to expire in October and the lack of any meaningful replacement in policy guidance, there is room for volatility, currently near historic lows, to become more elevated.   
   

Tuesday, June 17, 2014

FOMC Report June 17-18, 2014




Expectation: The June FOMC statement will remain largely unchanged from April though it will acknowledge slightly improved current growth prospects.  The ‘policy-path’ of tapering will continue with another $10 billion cut.  Work will continue but no firm exit strategy will be announced until the July FOMC meeting.  In the SEP, 2014 yearly growth expectations will be lowered. In an effort to learn more than the Fed is willing and able to divulge now, a reporter may move beyond the line of respectful inquiry.  Chair Yellen will be unfazed and will reiterate earlier offered guidance.  This is not a meeting that will shake things up.    

Two separate topics that currently rate high on the ‘go-to’ reading lists of market savvy are low volatility and Fed exit strategy.  Questions surround both and while proper questioning often produces useful answers, the transition from unknown to known, for the purposes of our discussion here, often involves strong market movement. 

Low volatility and decreased trading activity are evidenced across the spectrum of asset classes from bonds to stocks and from commodities to metals.  Low volatility along with unanswered questions is not really a steady state and we can expect that either low volatility will not persist or the answers found will have already been largely discounted. 

It has been years since the Fed last outlined an exit strategy from extraordinary accommodation.  It’s time for a revamp now, especially as consensus forecast places the policy rate lift-off date about a year away.  This of course is not to say that the policy rate, whether that is the heretofore standard fed funds or a newer possibility IOER or ON RRP, will be used in the first step in the transition from extraordinary accommodation to ‘normal’.   Another possible first step (or next step if you argue that tapering was the first step) would be for a quitting of the reinvestment of principal and interest in the SOMA portfolio.   In any event, we might expect this quandary being wrestled out in the market place would engender higher levels of volatility.  Policy maker’s comments should provide leverage to one side or the other in the argument thus creating more trade and greater volatility.  This has not been the case.   

One reason for lower volatility may simply be that there has been fewer Federal Reserve Board Governors’ with correspondingly fewer public comments.  The argument being that fewer conflicting comments invite a steadier market.  It is doubtful however that fewer Fed Governors’ are reason enough for punk trade and low volatility.  Greater weight might be afforded comments from fewer Governors’ instead of those messages being diluted by a fuller compliment of the Board. 

There is widespread expectation for the Fed Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) to show a still lower forecast for 2014 real GDP from the 2.8-3.0% projected in March.  Less certain but possible is a further lowering of the longer-run ‘equilibrium’ growth rate projection which, as written about in my March FOMC Report, has steadily declined since November 2011 from 2.5-2.7% central tendency to 2.2-2.3% in March. 

There is room for some disparity between the message as appears in the context of the FOMC statement and the apparent message from the dots in the SEP.  Stronger language in the FOMC statement related to brighter growth prospects and inflation that is coming more in line with Fed target may seem at odds with the continued low and possibly even lower marks for longer-run growth and equilibrium policy rates. 

Lower long-term growth expectations help to keep Treasury bond yields low but they can also have an impact on expectations for immediate prospect.  Where recoveries from recessionary periods generally experience growth above the longer-term trend, present expectation for depressed longer-run growth potential has a risk of stifling current growth.  Already, growth since recession end in June ’09 has only averaged 2.1%.   

If the Fed had a desire to mislead the public in an effort to bring long-rates lower, there is scarcely a better approach than to adjust lower public expectations for longer-run growth.  The Fed has helped reduce expectations for longer run growth by consistently missing their more optimistic nearer-period forecasts for growth over the last 4 years and by steadily lowering the SEP longer-run forecast over the last 2.5 years.  Endearing though arguably indicating ineptitude, neither the repeated annual growth forecast overshoot or the steady decline in long-run base growth potential forecast have been faked.

Chair Yellen shares an interest in painting a picture of longer-run prospects as accurately as possible as indicated in her stated and practiced principle.  However, she is also willing to act as a cheerleader as shown in efforts toward incorporating a wider interpretation of unemployment.  As such, she might want to tweak the FOMC statement description of current or immediate economic prospects slightly elevated relative to economists’ consensus in part as an effort to thwart a negative pull from a reduced longer-run GDP forecast in SEP. 


Volatility

Those who would assume that current low levels of volatility are simply attributable to dangerous levels of complacency may be missing an important consideration.  Central Banks have had a strong impact on the current level of volatility and this situation should be expected to persist for some time.  Economic agents have come to expect central bank intervention, transparency and guidance.  In general the message from central banks, the Fed in particular, has been that rates should be expected to remain low for some time.  The Fed has implied that even if economic conditions do not necessarily seem (by historic standards) to justify low policy rates, longer standing headwinds may warrant low policy rates to persist for a time.   

A greater influence on volatility than a message for persistent low rates is a belief that a decent chunk of the central bank policy rate timeline is knowable.  Different levels of confidence about the likely path for policy rates attend different periods of policy transition.  Historically, a transition from a neutral policy stance to a restrictive one would be expected to draw the greatest level of policy uncertainty.  More recently, this transition has been smoothed.  Incremental changes in policy have become the norm and concerns are much lower for more abrupt or hurried tightening.  Until the Fed gets a better handle on how to communicate during a restrictive (or removal of accommodation) policy initiative, the greatest risk for unwanted volatility will come toward the end of a tightening regime or when the Fed finishes raising rates.     

A low level of confidence for the Feds ability to determine the appropriate path for rates accompanied the height of the financial crisis.  While it was expected the Fed would react aggressively and bring policy rates lower, it was not apparent at the time either inside or outside of the Fed just how low rates might need to go and for how long would they need to stay there in order to arrest the deteriorating condition.  During such times, volatility and term premium remain high.  Later, after the recession ebbed and the extent of the damage appeared measurable, a greater confidence emerged in an ability to predict a longer period of the Fed policy rate timeline.  That greater confidence was followed by generally lower levels of volatility and term premium.   

However, we would be wrong to assume that lower levels of volatility and pressured term premiums necessarily coincide with low or declining policy rates.  Low volatility and term premium most certainly can come about during periods of rising policy rates.  Consider the period mid-’04 to mid-’06 when the Fed was struggling at lower levels along the communication learning curve.  At that time the Fed moved policy rates gradually higher in an entirely predictable fashion.  The VIX and MOVE indexes fell steadily during that period as economic agents seized upon the risk-friendly characteristics of the known policy-path.  Conversely, as the Fed lowered policy rates between ‘01 and ‘03, these indexes generally rose as economic agents were less confident that a lengthy policy-path for rates could be discerned.  

Again, possibly the biggest reason for increasing volatility in the Fed ‘easing’ period of ’01-’03 and the decreasing volatility in the ‘tightening’ period of ’04-’06 was due to the level of confidence economic agents had in their understanding of the Fed policy rate path.  In the ’04-’06 period economic agents reached great levels of confidence that the path for rates was known.  Confidence in a longer chunk of policy timeline, when policy initiative is an influential determinant of growth can clearly weigh on volatility and term premium.    

Currently economic agents have a high level of confidence that policy rates stretching far out the timeline are known.  As much as guidance from the Fed has helped to support this conviction, the economic and inflationary backdrop is also consistent with only modest improvement over the coming year almost irrespective of what the Fed might do.  Even though the Fed may move forward or backward slightly the expected timing of the policy rate lift-off there is still confidence that a post-lift-off glide path will be rather shallow.  It is not low rates or even the path for rates that impacts volatility as much as it is the expectation for variability about the path.  The Fed is expected to follow a well articulated script in the transition from aggressively accommodative to lesser levels of accommodation.  By providing believable likely future values for policy rates as well as the disposition of the SOMA portfolio, the Fed will for a time help to keep volatility low. 

However, and this is where I expect some to have difficulty following, if the Fed provides enough visibility in the form of usable transparency then volatility and term premiums should be expected to remain low and the appetite for taking risk will grow even as the Fed raises policy rates. 

The Fed may have shown some movement up the communication learning curve in the most recent policy shift toward tapering.   The Fed has learned to provide useful transparency in the form of a ‘policy-path’ description for the process of tapering of securities purchases.  Prior to the discrete and regular reduction in purchase amounts clearly articulated in the December FOMC statement and followed-up in action since, there was some heightened uncertainty concerning the process by which the Fed would step away from that form of accommodation.  By providing useful transparency in the form of measurable changes to expect in asset purchases and portfolio holdings through stages and time, the Fed helped to lower market volatility which in turn pressured term premiums and nominal rates lower.  The unknown Mr. Bernanke had awakened in the ‘taper-tantrum’ of mid-’13 had become a known policy-path, lending visibility and economic support despite lower levels of actual QE accommodation.

The Fed has become increasingly aware of the importance of communication and more adapt at affecting economic agent activities through the use of guidance.    It should be expected that the Fed’s application of guidance will be generous and widely encompassing in its use in tandem with each of its policy tools in the period of transition from greater to lesser levels of accommodation.  This has clearly been the case already with the tapering program.

Friday, April 25, 2014

FOMC Report April 29-30, 2014



Views at the Federal Reserve about the impact from severe winter weather on economic growth in Q1 2014 seem to change with the wind.  Upon the emergence of weaker economic data following harsh weather constraints, Fed officials were quick to recognize the negative impact from weather.  In the ‘Beige Book’ leading to the March FOMC meeting, reports of economic progress were upbeat; ‘Reports from most of the twelve Federal Reserve Districts indicated that economic conditions continued to expand from January to early February.’  However, where instances of slower growth were reported, weather was cited as causal; ‘New York and Philadelphia experienced a slight decline in activity, which was mostly attributed to the unusually severe weather experienced in those regions.’

By the time the Fed had met a few weeks later for the March FOMC meeting, staff economists had seemingly tired of the notion that weather was a primary contributor to weaker economic growth; ‘The information reviewed for the March 18-19 meeting indicated that economic growth slowed early this year, likely only in part because of the temporary effects of the unusually cold and snowy winter weather.’  By using the qualifier ‘only in part’ the Fed Staff indicated a growing concern that underlying conditions had deteriorated.

Finally, on April 16th Chair Yellen addressed the Economics Club of New York to discuss ‘Monetary Policy and the Economic Recovery’ noting; ‘The FOMC's current outlook for continued, moderate growth is little changed from last fall. In recent months, some indicators have been notably weak, requiring us to judge whether the data are signaling a material change in the outlook. The unusually harsh winter weather in much of the nation has complicated this judgment, but my FOMC colleagues and I generally believe that a significant part of the recent softness was weather related.’

The Fed has come full circle on their view of weather impact on growth over the last months, accepting now that it has been ‘significant’.  When they meet on April 29-30, the Fed will have the benefit of additional generally stronger economic data since the Beige Book was prepared at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and based on information collected before April 7, 2014.  Employment data has shown some improvement as has retail sales, confidence, industrial production and capacity utilization, leading indicators and most recently durable goods.  Additionally, inflation data was finally slightly higher than expected in March CPI and PPI reports.  Regional Fed banks indexes reporting on manufacturing and general conditions improved in Philadelphia, Chicago, Richmond and Kansas, but was reported softer early in the period by New York (Empire State). 

Despite generally improved economic data the Fed is expected to follow earlier articulated guidance concerning its purchase plans; ‘will likely reduce the pace of asset purchases in further measured steps at future meetings.’  The level of securities purchased on a monthly basis will thus likely be reduced by $10B to $45B starting in May, a fourth similar reduction.   We should also expect no change to the qualitative guidance on the policy rate.   

Chair Yellen provided a soft reference or definition for ‘considerable time’, as in; ‘that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and provided that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored.’  While Yellen suggested at the March FOMC post-meeting Q&A that ‘considerable’ might be roughly 6 months, we know to use this only as a rough guide and only if growth, employment, inflation and financial market conditions are consistent with projections.   

The Fed has been using some form of general period, date specific or threshold conditional policy rate guidance since the December 16, 2008 FOMC meeting where they indicated; ‘The Committee continues to anticipate that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some time.’ 

Since then, the Fed had used the guidance language ‘extended period’ to describe the likely time policy rates would be held at extremely accommodative levels until it moved to date specific language in August 2011; ‘are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.’

After extending that reference date to ‘late 2014’ in at the January 2012 FOMC meeting and then to ‘mid-2015’ in September of 2012, the Fed switched over to ‘Evan’s Rule’ - threshold guidance in December 2012, holding that language for a little over a year until the March 2014 meeting. 

The Fed is now using a softer ‘considerable time’ reference as it relates only to the period following the completion of the asset purchase program largely expected to end in October this year.  Of course, inflation needs to be found moving toward the 2% target before the Fed will commit to removing accommodation, but we find it curious that the Fed had removed from its March 2014 FOMC statement the necessity for stronger growth as specific requirement before reducing accommodation. 

The March 2014 FOMC Statement notes; ‘To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy remains appropriate.’  However, since December of 2012, this particular statement had always concluded with the reference; ‘that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens.’  Even before the December 2012 FOMC meeting statement referenced the purchase program, the September and October of 2012 statements referenced a period beyond recovered economic strength; ‘that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.’

Later in the March ‘14 FOMC statement the Fed did mention a post-purchase period for continued highly accommodative monetary policy.  However, they dropped the reference to growth and added only reference to hoped-for improved inflation conditions; ‘The Committee continues to anticipate, based on its assessment of these factors, that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and provided that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored.’  By indicating that the highly accommodative stance is appropriate ‘especially if’ projected inflation continues to run below…, the inflation condition can be read as an ideal state and not particularly a requirement before the Fed can decide to reduce accommodation.

For a very long time, the Fed has indicated that the highly accommodative policy stance should be expected to continue well beyond the time the economic recovery strengthens.  This has been removed in the March Statement.  It may be assumed, but it is not stated and it’s absence could be considered as a step toward removing barriers to lowering levels of accommodation.  The statement as it has been changed to now references policy appropriateness in the present and has thus reduced forward guidance.  Intended or not, this is how we should read that change.  Below find the aforementioned statement from present through the September 2012 meeting:    

Mar ’14 FOMC; ‘To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy remains appropriate.’

Jan ’14 FOMC; ‘To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens.’

Dec ’13 FOMC; ‘To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens.’

Oct ’13 FOMC; ‘To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. ‘

Sep ’13 FOMC; ‘To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens.’

July ’13 FOMC; ‘To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens.’

Jun ’13 FOMC; ‘To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens.’

May ’13 FOMC; ‘To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens.’

Mar ’13 FOMC; ‘To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens.’

Jan ’13 FOMC; ‘To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens.’

Dec ’12 FOMC; ‘To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens.’

Oct 12’ FOMC; ‘To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.’

Sep ’12 FOMC; ‘To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.’